



COMISSÃO LATINO-AMERICANA  
DE AVIAÇÃO CIVIL

LATIN AMERICAN CIVIL  
AVIATION COMMISSION

COMISIÓN LATINOAMERICANA DE AVIACIÓN CIVIL

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(Ciudad de Panamá, Panamá, 6 al 10 de noviembre de 2006)

**Cuestión 23 del  
Orden del Día:**

**Otros asuntos:**

- Presentación TSA (*Transportation Security Administration*) sobre “amenaza actual de los explosivos líquidos y los esfuerzos para detectarlos”  
***Tarea Nro. 7 del Programa de Trabajo de la CLAC***

**The Emerging Threat Environment**

(Nota informativa presentada por Estados Unidos de Norteamérica)

**SUMMARY**

The foiled 10 August 2006 terrorist plot in the United Kingdom revealed a new and imminent threat from liquid explosives and separate ignition components smuggled aboard transatlantic flights bound for the United States. In response, the international community raised threat levels and imposed strict limits on the amount of liquids, gels, and aerosols contained in carry-on or cabin baggage. Protecting the global aviation system demands high level of vigilance; the political will of every country to provide security for its own system is crucial to protecting the entire global system. To this end, in collaboration with ICAO's new Coordinated Assistance and Development section, the US is focusing on reaching out to multilateral funding agencies and training mechanisms to identify available resources for use by ICAO and individual States in meeting specific training needs. We look forward to partnering with civil aviation authorities in Latin America in identifying and fulfilling those needs.

## THE EMERGING THREAT ENVIRONMENT

### Introduction

1. The foiled 10 August 2006 terrorist plot in the United Kingdom revealed a re-emerging and imminent threat from liquid explosives (and separate ignition components) to transatlantic flights bound for the United States. The UK, US, European Union, Canada and many others in the international community raised threat levels and imposed strict limits the amount of liquids, gels, and aerosols contained in carry-on or cabin baggage. Consistent with these higher threat levels, the US Transportation Security Administration (TSA) immediately began coordination with national and international partners, airport authorities and commercial airlines to expand the intensity of existing security requirements. The investigation into the terrorist plot is still ongoing; therefore, the full scope of information concerning the plot is yet to be confirmed. The recent plot, however it may unfold, highlights the importance of developing a coordinated and flexible response internationally to emerging threats, recognition that aviation security is a national security and economic development issue, and, finally, that all States share in the responsibility to develop training and technical capacity in all regions of the world to achieve the highest levels of global aviation security.

### Discussion

2. **The US Response.** On September 26, TSA adjusted its total ban on liquids and gels, and began to allow travelers to carry travel-size toiletries (3 ounce or less) that fit comfortably in one quart-size, clear plastic, zip-top bag through security checkpoints. Travelers may also bring items, including beverages, purchased in the secure, boarding area on-board the aircraft. After the initial, total ban, TSA announced that its experts had learned enough from the UK investigation to say with confidence that small, travel size liquids are safe to bring through security checkpoints in limited numbers. Existing exemptions including larger amounts of required medications, baby formula and diabetic glucose treatments must be declared to security officers at the entrance of the checkpoint for screening.

3. TSA will be enhancing security measures throughout the airport environment, both visible and invisible to the traveling public. Examples of these measures include: more random screening of employees, additional canine patrols, stronger air cargo security measures, more rigorous identity verification standards and deploying more trained security officers in bomb appraisal and screening by observation techniques. It is unlikely that further adjustments to the ban on liquids, gels and aerosols will be made in the near future. The US Homeland Security threat level for aviation remains at Orange, or high, and is unlikely to change at this time. This security regime will apply to all domestic and international flights departing US airports. Aviation and airport authorities should inform travelers, however, to check with transportation security authorities in their country-of-origin for flights originating at non-US airports.

4. **International Response.** The United States and United Kingdom have continued to work closely and have shared technical and threat information with partners in Canada, the European Union and others. The international response to the UK terrorist plot required unprecedented levels of harmonization and teamwork. This event verified an important fact -- that we share a common security vision and can work together to make it a reality. Implementation approaches may differ as long as all nations achieve a common level of security. This has been achieved through daily interaction between aviation security, law enforcement, and intelligence officials, industry stakeholders, and the traveling public around the world. Despite the level of international cooperation, the political will of every country to provide security for its own system is crucial to protecting the global system.

5. **Potential Implications.** Protecting the global aviation system demands high level of vigilance because a single lapse in aviation security can result in hundreds of deaths, destroy equipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars, and have immeasurable negative impacts on the economies of hundreds of nations. States must recognize that increasing aviation security is an important national as well as global economic issue. The negative impact of 9/11 on the aviation industry is case in point. Governments must work closely with airports and air carriers on a number of different levels in order to meet the safety and security challenges of the future. Increased infrastructure development, international trade and tourism, and movement of goods and services are key outcomes of a safe and secure air transport system.

6. Given the interconnectedness of the civil aviation system, a sufficiently high level of security must be provided throughout the entire system. Flexibility to respond quickly to new information about aviation security threats is a pre-requisite. The costs associated with providing security must be incorporated in the decision-making process and weighed against the benefits. Understanding that economic issues underlie methods of regulating and providing aviation security will allow nations to balance conflicting positions over the appropriate level of government funding and involvement in this effort. Lack of compliance with international security measures reduces the economic benefits derived from and the future development of the air transport industry. The challenges for developing countries are numerous: the need for technical assistance and training; lack of investment in infrastructure and equipment; varying levels of political will and good governance worldwide; and a lack of economic regulation and transparency.

7. **The Impact on Latin America.** Given the impressive growth in air travel to and from Latin America, the recent plot in the UK highlights the urgency and the importance of our collective challenge to combat terrorism. It reminds us not only that terrorists remain intent on targeting air travel, but of the importance of a layered approach supported by close interagency and international cooperation.

8. Aviation security leaders worldwide are bound together in their duty and responsibility to protect passengers, freight and the aviation transportation network in a constantly changing threat environment. The threat to civil aviation does not affect only certain nations; it affects all nations. It is the responsibility of all States to ensure that the global security network protecting civil aviation is an effective one and that no State is perceived as one in which a terrorist may enter the secure network to target another State or its civil aviation assets.

9. Other regions, such as the Arab world and Asia, have faced challenges: an increasing threat environment; expanding international air traffic volume; and political and economic alliances that affect budding aviation policies. By pooling resources and adopting collective solutions, these entities could achieve much more than individual States.

10. **Technology is No Substitute for Imagination.** To mitigate the economic costs associated with aviation security, nations around the world are developing low-cost, innovative screening measures. Among them are behavioral observation programs that are designed to provide an additional layer of security by identifying passengers who exhibit stress, fear and/or deception which may indicate possible terrorist and/or criminal activity. For developing nations in particular, this can be a low cost and effective means of bolstering existing security measures using limited resources.

11. **Collectively Countering Future Threats to Civil Aviation.** Although we may have differing levels of national commitment, different funding, resources, and tools we use to meet international standards, we must together strive to do so. While we cannot compromise on meeting the international requirements, we can leverage individual and collective resources and knowledge in such a way as to support,

partner, and work together to achieve these goals. The US is working with ICAO, and its future aviation cooperation assistance program, to explore concrete ways forward to achieve this goal. Interim work will focus on reaching out to multilateral funding agencies and training mechanisms in the US and internationally to identify available resources for use by ICAO and individual States in meeting specific training needs. We have also reached out to other advanced donor States, primarily through the G-8, ICAO's Aviation Security Panel, the 2006 Japanese Ministerial Conference, and other international forums to gain support for the concept of a collective response.

12. Through the US Trade and Development Agency, TSA has also prepared a quality control training course for a number of countries. The objective of this training program is to educate participants on the applicable international protocols, and present methods for achieving a higher level of security to enhance the movement of goods and people. The goal is to provide a forum for participants to learn and to discuss how quality control can be enhanced in each of their countries and standardized throughout the regions. The training programs would also highlight the benefits to international trade that would result from better securing the commercial aviation sector.

13. This training consisted of two sets of three-day training programs in the Americas and in Asia, and three sets of three-day training programs in the Central Europe, Middle East and Africa Region (for a total of 21 training days across all 3 regions). The substance of the program addressed compliance by airport authorities with Annex 17 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. Three to five participants from four to six countries participated in each individual training program, so each training program included 15-26 participants. The training programs were identical in basic content, and adjusted slightly to address specific concerns and issues unique to each region. In 2006, TSA provided 20 training sessions to countries affiliated with the Organization of American States involving approximately 200 international students. The training sessions involve National Program Development as it pertains to ICAO signatory responsibilities.

14. We look forward to partnering with the civil aviation authorities of Latin America to continue developing training programs that meet your needs. Certification of the Transportation Security Administration's training facility for aviation security in Oklahoma City as an ICAO center will aid in these efforts.

## **Conclusion**

15. While not every State has the resources available to develop, procure, and deploy the latest technology at its airports. Raising the baseline for security, including guarding against the threat posed by liquid explosives, can and should involve all available means. Technology is not a substitute for imagination, and imagination is much less expensive than the latest multiple view X-ray technology. States should be encouraged to explore combinations of measures, practices, and philosophies to achieve the highest baseline for aviation security, including:

- using random security configurations to create unpredictability;
- leveraging existing technologies in innovative ways;
- exercising advanced management styles focused on reducing risk; and,
- developing robust quality control programs to ensure compliance with security regimes.

16. The U.S. is keen to support regional assistance programs that can help States develop inexpensive and effective security tools that will help the region respond effectively to future threats. Such

support would include delivery of training modules through regional and donor-sponsored centers; and conducting outreach bilaterally and jointly through experts meetings and seminars to share information and impart technical knowledge; build upon this meeting by identifying specific roles and responsibilities of Latin American regional and functional organizations to avoid duplication of effort; conduct outreach to funding organizations and other organizations involved in capacity-building assistance, such as the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to discuss areas of mutual interest in the funding and provision of capacity-building assistance.

17. Ultimately we believe States should work collectively to provide technical and training assistance to developing countries and, thereby, strengthen the international aviation security network over the long term.

**Regulatory Situation re Restrictions on Liquids, Gels and Aerosols  
 In Cabin (Carry On) Baggage**

<b>State/ Region</b>	<b>Quantity Restrictions</b>	<b>Cabin Baggage Restrictions</b>	<b>Duty Free</b>	<b>Crew / Staff Exempt</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>Canada</b>	1 L (~1 qt) baggie – 90 mL (~3 oz) per container	None	Canadian and U.S. origin OK (if purchased post screening); if purchased pre- screening or from outside Canada and U.S. must be placed in checked baggage	Yes for Crew; No for Staff	Staff randomly screened  Will accept EC quantity limit (100 mL (3.3 oz))  Exemption items (medicines (name on label matches boarding pass) and baby food/formula) permitted in larger quantities.
<b>Europe (EC)</b>	1 L (~1 qt) baggie – 100 mL (3.3 oz) per container (Effective 6 Nov 06)	56 x 45 x 25 cm (Effective 6 May 07)	OK when purchased at airports within the EU or on EU registered air carriers on flights within or outside the EU (must be in specified tamper evident bags with sales receipt dated same day as presented for screening – some allowance may be made for flights over the midnight hour or for time zone changes); Otherwise it must be placed in checked baggage (Effective 6 Nov. 06)	<b>Yes</b> Austria, Belgium (only in crew lane), Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland  No Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg (yes shortly), Sweden, United Kingdom  Common EC exemption under development.	Includes Norway, Iceland and Switzerland who will also implement EC requirements.  Exemption items (medicines (with doctors certificate) and baby food/formula) permitted in larger quantities.

State/ Region	Quantity Restrictions	Cabin Baggage Restrictions	Duty Free	Crew / Staff Exempt	Comments
<b>ICAO</b>	<b>TBD</b> (Nov. 06)	TBD (Nov. 06 or Mid 07)	TBD (Nov. 06 or Mid 07)	TBD (Nov. 06 or Mid 07)	Issues currently under consideration per AVSEC Panel direction
<b>India</b>	All prohibited	Only 1 bag per passenger	No	No	Only exemption items (medicines (with doctors certificate) and baby food/formula) permitted.
<b>Nepal</b>	All prohibited	Only 1 bag per passenger	Unknown	Unknown	Only exemption items (medicines (with doctors certificate) and baby food/formula) permitted.
<b>United Kingdom</b>	1 L (~1 qt) baggie – 100 mL (~3oz) per container (Effective 6 Nov 06)	56 x 45 x 25 cm  Only 1 bag per passenger + <b>one oversized musical instrument if in its case</b>	UK origin OK; from outside UK must be placed in checked baggage; within EU will be OK Effective 6 Nov. 06	No	Only exemption items (medicines and baby food/formula) permitted until 6 Nov. 06.  <b>Exemption items (medicines (with doctors certificate) and baby food/formula) permitted in larger quantities after 6 November 06.</b>
<b>United States</b>	1 L (1 qt) baggie – 90 mL (~3 oz) per container	None	U.S. and Canadian origin OK (if purchased post screening); if purchased pre-screening or from outside U.S. and Canada must be placed in checked baggage	Yes	Quantity restrictions apply to all inbound flights as well.  Will accept EC quantity limit (100 mL (3.3 oz))